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Alvarez-Moreno and Rodriguez-Morales provide timely, considered 
observations to optimise strategies for investigation of potential rein-
fection among recovered cases of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) [1]. This is particularly important given 
more recent recognition of variants of concern, including speculation of 
spike protein mutations that may confer a degree of immune escape [2]. 
Alvarez-Moreno and Rodriguez-Morales highlight the limitations of 
RNA polymerase chain reaction (PCR) for inferring infection with viable 
virus in such cases, particularly following observations on the limited 
capacity to isolate virus after eight days of symptoms, despite prolonged 
periods of RNA shedding [3]. They conclude by urgently calling for 
multi-faceted investigative case reports in order to assist the develop-
ment of diagnostic pathways in this situation. 
We therefore report the management of one such case involving a 25 
year-old female healthcare worker working in a high-acuity intensive 
care setting who tested positive on April 19, 2020 for SARS-CoV-2 an-
tibodies as part of a serological staff screening programme implemented 
in April at the referring hospital [4]. The patient reported a new onset 
cough two weeks prior to testing that had since resolved and testing 
demonstrated the presence of SARS-CoV-2 specific IgG antibodies 
(Encode SARS-CoV-2 CE marked split IgM/IgG One Step Rapid Test 
Device) [4]. The patient re-presented to the symptomatic staff testing 
programme on the June 16, 2020 with new onset symptoms of cough, 
headache and fluctuating fevers over the preceding five days. There was 
a strong clinical suspicion of COVID-19 infection and PCR testing was 
positive for SARS-CoV-2 (AusDiagnostics, Australia). Case investigation 
was completed by the clinical infection team at the referring hospital, 
with support from the national reference laboratory (Public Health En-
gland). Further investigation included retrieval of the 16 June naso-
pharyngeal swab sample for retesting for both SARS-CoV-2 and a full 
respiratory panel for common respiratory pathogens. The patient was 
recalled once symptom free and nasopharyngeal swabbing was 
repeated. Repeat serological testing was also carried out. 
On review of the initial swab from June 16, 2020, only the ORF1ab 
target was detected towards the lower limit of detection (with a second 
stage cycle threshold of 24.65) and a negative second target (ORF 8). 
Repeat testing of this original sample was negative for SARS CoV-2 but 
the full viral respiratory panel was strongly positive for rhinovirus/ 
enterovirus. Repeat PCR testing on July 09, 2020, 24 July and August 
17, 2020 as part of staff screening requirements were also negative. 
Repeat antibody testing with the Abbott IgG anti-nucleocapsid chemi-
luminescent microparticle immunoassay was reactive (Binding ratio 
3.46). In this case, it was concluded that rhinovirus/enterovirus was the 
cause of the new symptoms with the initial positive SARS-CoV-2 PCR 
result either a false positive result or some low-level remnant RNA from 
past infection. 
While we agree with Alvarez-Moreno and Rodriguez-Morales in that 
confirmation of reinfection may require demonstration of inoculation of 
isolated virus on cell lines or demonstration of molecularly distinct vi-
ruses following evidence of clearance, we would add further detail to 
their strategy [1]. We highlight that this is limited by the requirement 
for a dedicated containment level 3 laboratory and experience in cell 
maintenance, inoculation and viral culture. Since publication, the 
COVID-19 Genomics UK (COG-UK) consortium initiative have identified 
a variant of concern (B 1.1.7) that now predominates throughout the UK 
and is in part characterised by S gene target failure [2]. Despite the 
COG-UK undertaking the largest such initiative in the world at present, 
and with a turnaround time that can be sufficient to impact clinical 
management, real-time throughput remains challenging. Identifying the 
development of S gene target failure in such cases, for example, could 
help highlight samples for sequencing. Recognition of such test char-
acteristics could help to maximise this limited resource in the context of 
consideration for possible reinfection going forward. Additionally, we 
demonstrate how early investigation of suspected cases of SARS-CoV-2 
reinfection can be undertaken in order to rule out reinfection locally. 
Where concordance between PCR-positive infection and detection of 
anti-nucleocapsid antibodies is incomplete [4], additional serological 
testing with anti-spike protein immunoassays could add further value. 
Review and retesting of initial PCR samples should be undertaken in 
order to assess the possibility of a false positive result. Resampling of 
nasopharyngeal swabs could provide further support where doubt re-
mains but must be considered in the clinical context. Serological testing 
may increase confidence in alternative diagnoses but should be inter-
preted with caution. This is particularly the case where serological as-
says are limited to non-neutralizing nucleocapsid targets. Additionally, 
it is unclear how emerging reports of antibody decline in the early 
convalescent period may affect interpretation going forward [5]. 
We suggest that while a multi-tiered approach is required for a robust 
investigation of potential cases of reinfection, including SARS-CoV-2 
sequencing, this should in the first instance include local testing 
(where available) looking for S-gene drop out, alternative viral patho-
gens, and testing for SARS-CoV-2 serological markers, as described in 
recent guidance [6]. Organisation of provision for cell line cultures 
where required is best delivered at a national level according to defined 
protocols, such as those developed through PHE’s SIREN (Sarscov2 
Immunity & REinfection EvaluatioN) study. 
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